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Abstract
Mobility is a key element of the future Internet. The location privacy prob-
lem is one of the problems involved in mobility. A great bene¯t of universally
available access to the Internet might bring a risk such that a user's location is
traceable by others.
Most of the mobility protocols de¯ne a mechanism of informing the cor-
respondents of location change, in order to realize mobility. Therefore, the
correspondents and eavesdroppers on the path will notice a movement and its
destination.
The problem changes its situation, according to the node from which the
location of a mobile node should be concealed. We classify the nodes into two
types: correspondents or onlookers on the path. In addition, we often assume
there are some trustworthy nodes on the path.
There are some existing researches on this problem, e.g. HIP Location
Privacy Framework by Matos et al. and BLIND by Ylitalo and Nikander. They
showed that it is possible to conceal location from a correspondents and a part
of onlookers by introducing a trustworthy helper node, and especially when
mobility is not needed at all, from all the onlookers, too.
In this research, we have proposed a new framework using Host Identity
Protocol (HIP), and with it we showed that it is also possible to protect lo-
cation privacy from all other nodes in IP communication with mobility. We
take advantage of the notable feature of HIP that public keys are used as host
identi¯ers, so that our framework gives a way to separate IDs for mobility from
those for end-to-end communication. We constructed an extensional mobility
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The Internet is now moving on to the next stage. Wireless infrastructures are
getting more commonly available, and IPv6 network is actively promoted to
replace the IPv4 network. Compared to the days when the current Internet was
designed, circumstances are totally di®erent.
Mobility is a key concept here. A °exible architecture is needed in a place
where mobile nodes freely roam around networks and communicate with each
other, dynamically changing its address. As well as mobility, security and pri-
vacy have become very important. It is desired that people are protected from
gathering and analyzing sensitive user data.
The location privacy problem is a common problem among mobility proto-
cols. In order to keep a session, a mobile node has to inform another node of the
location change. This location updating message easily reveals the location of
the mobile node to others. It is di±cult to give a complete solution to this. So,
there are several proposals to solve this problem, which o®er partial solutions
with a trustworthy helper node.
Our purpose is to integrate mobility and location privacy. We use Host Iden-
tity Protocol (HIP) as the core mobility protocol. HIP is designed for realizing
mobility and multihoming IP environment in a secure way. The \identi¯er
is public key" principle is natural and powerful in dealing with security and
privacy. We take advantage of this property to construct a location privacy
protection framework with mobility support in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, some basic knowledge
in IP mobility and location privacy is introduced in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3,
two location privacy frameworks are explained, and compared in achievement.
Then, we propose the design of a new location privacy framework in Chapter




In this chapter, we introduce some basic concepts and terminology in IP mobility
and related privacy issues, which take an important part in the later discussion.
We explain basics of IP mobility in 2.1, with illustrations of Mobile IP and
LIN6. Location privacy is de¯ned in 2.2. Host Identity Protocol is introduced
in 2.3, with the properties on its mobility and location privacy.
2.1 Transparent IP Mobility
Mobile Node (MN) is a node which can roam over networks, and Correspondent
Node (CN) is a node which corresponds with an MN. CN is possibly mobile
node, too.
Some mobility protocols, such as Mobile IP[1][2], LIN6[3] and HIP[4], pro-
vide mobility support. With these protocols, an MN can change its location and
the change is transparent to upper layers. End-point applications are totally
independent of the roaming and do not have to manage location information.
Therefore legacy applications also work without upgrade.
2.1.1 Identi¯er/Locator Split
In the current TCP/IP network, IP address has two roles: end-point identi¯er
and locator of a host.
Applications use end-point identi¯ers so as to distinguish hosts and designate
particular correspondents. On the other hand, locators represent a topological
location in the network and are used as routing information in packet delivery.
One of shortcomings in the current TCP/IP architecture is the fact that it
does not support host mobility. IP address is locator de¯ned in the network
layer, however, applications regard it as an end-point identi¯er, and assume that
IP address of a correspondent remains same during a whole session. Therefore, a
session will be broken when the host changes its IP address, unless applications
take a special care for that.
If locators and identi¯ers are separated clearly, it becomes much easier to
realize transparent mobility. For example, Mobile IP de¯nes Home Address
(HoA) as an identi¯er and Care-of Address (CoA) as a locator. Home Address
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is the IP address of the MN while it locates in its Home Network. Care-of
Address is an IP address assigned in another network, when the MN is apart
from its Home Network.
2.1.2 Rendezvous Protocols
Mobility also requires some means for rendezvous, namely creation of a new
session with an MN whose current location is unknown.
Rendezvous in Mobile IPv6 One solution is to use a middlebox to forward
packets destined for the MN. In Mobile IP, a Home Network has a node called
Home Agent (HA). An HA always locates in its Home Network and manages
identi¯er-locator bindings of the MNs belonging to the Home Network. When
an MN leaves the Home Network and joins in a remote network, the HA of the
Home Network behaves like a middlebox between the MN and CNs. After the
HA receives a binding update message from the MN, every packet destined for
the MN's Home Address is forwarded to the corresponding Care-of Address.
Mobile IP speci¯es two modes. In bidirectional tunneling mode, packets
from an MN to the CN is also forwarded by the MN's HA. Mobile IP also
de¯nes route optimization mode, where the MN can notify CNs its own Care-of
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Figure 1: Mobile IPv6
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Rendezvous in LIN6 Another solution for rendezvous is to use a query-
based system like DNS, though DNS is not suitable due to its slow update
mechanism. Each MN stores its identi¯er-locator binding in a database node
in a public network, and maintains the binding. Those who wants to send a
packet to an MN can ask the database of the MN for its current locator. For
instance, LIN6 follows this manner; Mapping Agent works as a public database
node and manages bindings between LIN6 ID and IP address (Figure 2).
Mapping Agent
MN CN
1. query a locator of the MN
2. answer
3. end-to-end communication
Figure 2: LIN6 communication with Mapping Agent
Anyway, we need a help of another functional entity for a rendezvous mech-
anism.
2.2 Location Privacy
Location privacy is ability to prevent other parties from learning one's current
and/or past location [5]. It concerns unlinkability between identi¯ers when
a movement happens. To guarantee complete location privacy, any relation
between a location and identi¯ers of the node must be concealed from others.
2.2.1 Privacy Threat
In general, privacy problems range over multiple layers [6] [7]. It is not solved
independently in each layer. There are many types of identi¯ers, e.g. MAC
address in the link layer, IP Address in the network layer, SIP URI or E-mail
Address in the application layer, and so on. Some are used globally and others
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locally. Some are used permanently and others just temporarily. Sequence
Number and Port Number in the transport layer, or SPI value in IPsec are
examples of temporary identi¯ers. End-point identi¯er is global and constant
in natural. Therefore we should carefully consider the unlinkability of location
with it.
When an identi¯er changes and another identi¯er remains the same, the
change can be traced by a node which observed the communication. An attacker
might bind all identi¯ers of a node so that he obtains a complete history of IP
address change of the target.
2.2.2 Privacy Goals
Our goal is to get an environment where location privacy is completely pro-
tected. All the users are not revealed their location at all in such an environ-
ment. Therefore, any identi¯er of a node must be unlinkable to its locator.
There are potential adversary nodes both in CNs and onlookers. Our pri-
mary goal is to conceal roaming from general onlookers. Then, the next priority
is to conceal from the CN.
Moreover, we often assume trusted third parties. The location privacy re-
quirement also holds true for them. The word `trusted' means that they are
supposed not to abuse private information of the users. However, the informa-
tion leakage to the trusted third party by itself should be avoided if possible;
Suppose that ISPs or cell phone companies have all your location history over
your whole life.
There is a sensitive problem in relation to criminal investigation. Anonymity
sometimes hinders police from identifying and locating criminals. In our situa-
tion, identi¯cation is not interfered. We assume that both end-points authen-
ticate each other using their signature. However, location privacy protection
has an in°uence on di±culty in locating a node. We should not encourage a
criminal use.
2.2.3 Location Privacy in Mobile IPv6
Location privacy problems in Mobile IPv6 are summarized in [8]. They consists
of two problems:
² To disclose Care-of Address to CNs
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² To reveal Home Address to onlookers
Note that a CN ordinarily knows the MN's identi¯er, namely Home Address,
while an onlooker does not know the binding of the MN unless he/she analyzes
the header options or encapsulated payload in the °owing packets.
In the route optimization mode, an MN can communicates with its CN
through the HA or directly. The MN will choose more preferable way according
to who the CN is. As long as the MN use reverse tunneling to the HA, the
CN does not know the MN's Care-of Address. By contrast, when the MN takes
advantage of route optimization to enjoy a more e±cient communication, the
CN will learn both HoA and CoA of the MN. When the roaming of the MN
happens, the CN in a direct communication will receive the Binding Update
message and recognize the roaming. On the other hand, onlookers on the MN-
CN path can learn the HoA and CoA of the MN by checking Home Address
Option and Routing Header in the packets.
In the bidirectional tunneling mode, it seems to the CN and the onlookers on
the HA-CN path, as if the MN locates in its Home Network. Meanwhile, those
on the MN-HA path possibly learn the MN's location. It depends on whether
the payload in the reverse tunnel is encrypted or not. If the inner IP packet is
encrypted in IPsec ESP, the onlookers on the MN-HA path can't distinguish it
from ordinary IPsec packet from the CoA to the HoA.
In whichever mode, the HA holds the MN's location all the time. As de-
scribed in the previous section, the HA is trusted but we should also take this
node into consideration.
Of course, there is a trade-o® between location privacy and e±ciency in the
communication. Bidirectional tunneling mode with encryption is not always
the best choice.
2.3 Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Host Identity Protocol (HIP)[4][9][10] supports mobility, multihoming, and se-
curity in an integrated fashion. Public/private key pairs are used as end-point
identi¯ers to separate IP address from ID use and also to provide authentication
mechanism based on public key cryptography. HIP conceptually introduces a
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new layer between network and transport, called Host Identity layer. ID-locator
bindings are manged and translated in this layer.
This protocol is still an experimental one and being discussed in the IETF.
2.3.1 Host Identity
Host Identity (HI) is created based on digital signature. Each host owns a
public/private key pair, and hosts are identi¯ed by the possession of a private
key corresponding to particular signature.
Since the size of an HI is not uniquely speci¯ed and usually it is quite large
(512, 1024, or 2048 bits), Host Identity Tag (HIT) is used as an end-point









Figure 3: Structure of Host Identity Tag
Figure 3 shows the structure of a HIT. A HIT consists of 28-bit ORCHID pre-
¯x and 100-bit hash value. HIT is designed as an ORCHID (Overlay Routable
Cryptographic Hash Identi¯ers) [11], which represents a special class of IPv6
Address. A HIT can be used as an \IPv6 Address" in the application layer.
This encourages the reuse of legacy applications.
2.3.2 HIP Base Exchange
In HIP, transport communications are encapsulated with IPsec ESP. Owing to
this, end-points have a key exchange phase in the beginning of a HIP session, as
in a usual IPsec session. HIP de¯nes a speci¯c key exchange protocol called the
HIP base exchange. In this process, the initiator and the responder exchange
their HIs as well as the keying material to establish a Security Association (SA).
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Figure 4 shows how the base exchange proceeds. The base exchange is a 4-
ResponderInitiator
IPsec data trafic
I1 : HIT(I)  HIT(R)
R1: HIT(R)  HIT(I)  Puzzle  DH(R)  HI(R)  sig
I2: HIT(I)  HIT(R)  solution  SPI(I)  DH(I)  HI(I)  sig
R2: HIT(R)  HIT(I)  SPI(R)  sig
Figure 4: The HIP base exchange protocol
way handshake process, consisting of respectively I1, R1, I2, R2 packets. These
packets commonly contains source and destination HITs in their HIP header.
The initiator sends the I1 packet to initiate a base exchange. On receiving
the I1 packet, the responder immediately replies a prepared R1 packet. The
R1 packet contains a puzzle. The puzzle is a cryptographic question, which
ask the initiator to calculate an original number of a hash value by brute-
force computation. Usually it takes several seconds. And then, the initiator
sends the I2 packet containing the solution of the puzzle. Until the responder
checks that the solution is correct, it does not store any state to avoid DoS
attacks. In addition, the R1 and I2 packets carry their Host Identity to verify
the signature, and a Di±e-Hellman value to calculate a keying material for
Security Associations (SAs).
In this process, the end-points create SAs and exchange the SPI values by
I2 and R2. After the base exchange, transport communications starts over the
established SAs. The HITs are associated with the SPI values, and so they are
resolved in the HIP layer.
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2.3.3 Rendezvous Mechanism and Mobility
Rendezvous Server (RVS) is a HIP node which performs the I1 packet forwarding
[12]. An MN registers in a RVS beforehand, following the HIP registration
protocol [13]. Then the CN is able to utilize the RVS to initiate a communication
with the MN (Figure 5).
The CN, as an initiator, gets the HIT of the MN and the IP address of
the RVS the MN registered with, for example, by DNS. The I1 packet sent
by the CN is attached FROM option at the RVS, and forwarded to the MN.
Since the MN sees the IP address from the FROM option, it can send the reply
(R1) directly to the initiator. The R1 packet includes VIA option so that the
initiator can con¯rm that the packet was forwarded using RVS. The following










Figure 5: HIP Rendezvous Mechanism
As for the roaming, [14] gives the speci¯cation. When a MN change its IP
address during a session, the MN sends a HIP UPDATE message to the CN
and its RVS, followed by the 3-way messages to con¯rmation. This process is
transparent to the transport layer, similarly to the general mobility protocol.
Moreover, RVS gives a solution for \double jump". When both end-points
roam at once and miss the location of the correspondent, they attempt to make
a new session through RVS.
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2.3.4 Location Privacy in HIP
HIP itself does not have a particular function for location privacy. On the
contrary, as usual in mobility protocols, HIP introduces privacy risks with use
of a global persistent identi¯er, which strongly identi¯es a user. As described in
2.2.1, the user can be tracked by constant identi¯ers before and after roaming,
over multiple protocol layers.
HIP with Upper Layers HIP supports IPsec ESP by default. If the trans-
port data is encrypted by ESP in tunneling mode or BEET1) mode, all the
header information in transport or upper layers is concealed.
HIP with Lower Layers A natural approach to reduce privacy threats is
to change identi¯ers regularly in a short term. Moreover, identi¯ers in all the
protocol layers should be changed simultaneously.
A HIP privacy architecture in which identi¯ers in MAC, IP, and HIP/IPsec
layers are changed simultaneously was proposed [15]. In this paper, we assume
a similar architecture, and do not deal with problems of the lower layers.
1) Bound End-to-End Tunnel
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Chapter 3 Related Works
In this chapter, we show two location privacy frameworks: HIP Location Privacy
Framework and BLIND.
3.1 HIP Location Privacy Framework
This is a framework proposed by Matos et al. [16] and discussed in the Internet-
Draft [17].
A special HIP node called Rendezvous Agent (RVA) is introduced. An RVA
keeps a lot of global IP addresses and lease them to registered MNs. Thus, an
registered MN is leased a virtual network interface and multihomed.
There is a local network area which accompanies an RVA, called RVA pro-
tected area. An RVA is a middlebox which locates at the border of a public
and a protected network. It forwards packets in both direction. Tra±c in a
protected area is separated from public. In this way, An RVA hide the actual
locator of an MN from outer nodes.
RVAs also support two kinds of handovers. The intra-RVA handover helps
local mobility in a protected area. An MN send UPDATE message to the RVA,
so that it maintains its forwarding table. The handover events are not observed
by nodes outside.
The inter-RVA handover helps a network migration to another RVA pro-
tected area. Suppose that an MN is located at the RVA1's protected area, and
wants to migrate to the RVA2's. The MN noti¯es its migration to the RVA1
and register to the RVA2. Then, the packets for the MN which has been arrived
at RVA1 after its leaving are forwarded to RVA2, and ¯nally sent to the MN.
Outer nodes can observe an inter-RVA migration, and they get the location of
the RVA hiding the MN. However, they cannot learn the exact location of the
MN.
3.2 BLIND
The BLIND Framework [18] o®ers a complete end-to-end identity protection in
a static communication. Using a sophisticated key exchange protocol, end-point
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identi¯ers are anonymized to onlookers. Moreover, locators can be concealed
from the correspondents by introducing Forwarding Agent (FA).
This framework works with any protocol like HIP, where public keys are used
as end-point identi¯ers. In this section, a HIP speci¯c version of the BLIND is
explained.
3.2.1 Blinded Identi¯ers
In BLIND, raw end-point identi¯ers are not disclosed in the packet header.
Blinded identi¯ers are used instead.
Blinding is an operation de¯ned in this framework, which consists of con-
catenation and SHA1 hash function. A blinded HIT (BHIT) is generated per
key exchange. A di®erent nonce (Nk) is randomly chosen in each time, thus
k-th blinding function is de¯ned as follows:
blindk : HIT ! BlindedHIT
p jj x 7! p jj hash(Nk jj x)
Here, p represents the 28-bit ORCHID pre¯x and the symbol jj represents the
bit-concatenation operator. In the k-th session, a HIT h is mapped to blindk(h).
Note that end-points are still identi¯ed by HIT in upper layers. Mappings
between HIT and BHIT are managed in the HIP layer.
3.2.2 Key Exchange Protocol
Figure 6 shows the extended HIP base exchange, with header information in
each packet. By comparing with the original HIP base exchange, you will notice
that source and destination HITs are replaced by blinded HITs.
When the responder receives an I1 packet, it is seemingly very di±cult to
determine HITR from BHITR because it calculates the inverse of one-way hash
function. However, if the responder knows all of the candidates for HITR and
they are few enough, testing each HIT with the given nonce will tell the correct
answer at a slight cost. Since it can be considerable cost for a busy server which
possesses a lot of HITs, HINT option is de¯ned to reveal a few bits of the raw
HIT. The initiator can control the number of bits to be revealed.
Receiving the R1 packet, the initiator can calculate the Di±e-Hellman key-




I1 : BHIT(I)  BHIT(R)  Nonce  [Hint]
R1: BHIT(R)  BHIT(I)  Puzzle  DH(R)  Pseudonym(R)  sig
I2: HIT(I)  HIT(R)  Solution  SPI(I)  Nonce  DH(I)  {HI(I)}  sig
R2: BHIT(R)  BHIT(I)  SPI(R)  {HI(R)}  sig
Figure 6: The Blind Base Exchange
veri¯ed later, when the initiator receives HIR in the R2 packet.
3.2.3 Forwarding Agent (FA)
Forwarding Agents (FA) [9] behave like SPINAT[19]. They forward an IPsec
packet according to the source/destination addresses and the SPI value in a
packet. However, they are di®erent from SPINAT, in that they do not have to
be located at the border between public/private networks.
FAs has a number of IP addresses and a HIP node can lease a virtual interface
from an FA to be virtually located there. When HIP nodes perform a base
exchange through an FA, the FA automatically saves the IP addresses, HITs
and SPI values of the both end-points. Similarly, it updates the SPI values in
the database when forwarding an UPDATE packet.
In a BLIND context, an initiator obtains complete location privacy. All
the other nodes cannot get both of the HIT and IP address of it; Responders
cannot get the initiator's IP address, while FAs and other onlookers cannot get
the initiator's HIT.
FAs can be trustworthy or untrustworthy. Trustworthy FAs authenticate a
host before leasing their interface, while untrustworthy ones allow anonymous
leases. When using a trustworthy FA, the user's identity is revealed to the FA,
so the user's location privacy is not protected from it. On the other hand, an
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untrustworthy FA provides a complete location privacy for users.
However, both nodes rely on the conscience of users. They are vulnerable
to attacks of too many leasing by a malicious node. This problem is discussed
again in the next chapter.
3.3 Degree of Location Privacy
In this section, we summarize the result of each protocol. They are evaluated
in terms of location privacy.
The symbol ° shows that the node does not threaten location privacy of
the MN, while the symbol £ shows that the node can get both identi¯er and
locator of the MN.
3.3.1 Mobile IPv6 (Bidirectional Tunneling)
Table 1 shows the location privacy of an MN in the bidirectional tunneling mode
of Mobile IPv6. There are two kinds of routing paths:
² MN ! HA ! CN
² CN ! HA ! MN
Table 1: Mobile IPv6 (Bidirectional Tunneling)
Encapsulation MN-HA HA HA-CN CN
plain £ £ ° °
encrypted °
Because the packets on both directions go through HA, the CN and onlookers
on the CN's side do not get the CoA of the MN. On the other hand, onlookers
on the MN's side depend on the encryption of the encapsulated packet. The
HA always holds the binding of the MN.
3.3.2 HIP Location Privacy Framework
Table 2 shows the location privacy of an MN in HLPF. There are three kinds
of paths:
² MN ! RVA ! CN
² CN ! RVS ! RVA ! MN
14
² CN ! RVA ! MN
Table 2: HIP Location Privacy Framework
MN-RVA RVA RVA-RVS RVS RVS-CN CN CN-RVA
¡ £ ° ° ° ° °
It is similar as Mobile IPv6 in terms of location privacy. The nodes outside
of the RVA cannot get the real location of the MN. As for the inner nodes, it
depends on how packets are carried in the RVA protected area and it is not
speci¯ed. In the case of normal IP, the location is not concealed. The RVA
always knows the HI and the IP address of its registrants.
3.3.3 BLIND (direct)
Table 3 shows the location privacy of an MN in BLIND, directly communicating
with a CN. There are two kinds of paths:
² MN ! CN




Onlookers on the MN-CN will not get the identi¯er of the MN. They see only
the BHIT. In this case, the MN can roam around networks.
However, the CN can get both HI and IP address of the MN.
3.3.4 BLIND (with FA)
Table 4 shows the location privacy of an MN in BLIND, communicating through
an FA. There are two kinds of paths:
² MN ! FA ! CN
² CN ! FA ! MN
In trustworthy FA, MNs are authenticated in some way (not limited in Host
Identity), therefore the FA knows an identity of the MN and its location. An
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Table 4: BLIND with FA
FA type MN-FA FA FA-CN CN
trustworthy ° £ ° °
untrustworthy °
untrustworthy FA knows about the MN as well as onlookers.
Anyway, mobility mechanism is not supported in this case.
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Chapter 4 Protocol Design
In the BLIND Framework with an FA, an MN can conceal its location from the
other nodes. In this chapter, we de¯ne a mobility management protocol so as
to add in mobility and security to the BLIND Framework.
4.1 Packet Forwarding at FA
4.1.1 Temporary Host Identity (THI)
We introduce Temporary Host Identity (THI) to decouple IDs for communica-
tions and those for roaming. THI is an HI of the MN, which is used for FAs to
identify the MN. It is an identi¯er for mobile functionality. General applications
do not use it for an end-point identi¯er. Using THI, the MN can roam around
without leaking its global HIT.
4.1.2 THI Registration
First, an MN registers to an FA with its THI. It follows HIP Registration
Extension [13].
Later in Section 4.4, we describe an anonymous authentication in the regis-
tration phase, where the FA can con¯rm that the MN is permitted to use the
FA without knowing the real identity of the MN.
It is assumed that the FA has quite a large number of IPv6 addresses for a
lease. On registration, the FA assigns one of its global IP address to the MN
in some ¯nite period of time. As a result, the MN virtually locates at the FA's
network.
In this step, the FA stores a 5-tuple in the database (THIDB):
(THIT; THI; IPreal; IPforward; Lifetime)
THIT (Temporary Host Identity Tag) is a tag for a THI, as a HIT is for an
HI. IPforward is the FA's address leased to the MN.
4.1.3 Forwarding IP Packets to the MN
When an FA receives a packet and the destination IP address is leased to a
registered MN, the packet is forwarded to the MN unless the lease is expired.
Since this might cause some security problems such as DoS attacks, it is
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preferable that a user of the MN can control the forwarding rule in some way,
e.g. he/she can limit source IP addresses.
4.1.4 Forwarding HIP Packets from the MN
FAs also forward packets sent by a registered MN. This must be done carefully
since the destination is arbitrary. It is likely that an MN is spoofed and utilized
for attacks.
FAs are designed to forward only valid HIP packets. A HIP session is veri¯ed
at the FA in the base exchange or the update processes in HIP, checking that
the source THIT is registered and the packet is signed by the THI. Following
data packets are checked whether the tuple of IP addresses and SPI is belongs
to some veri¯ed session.
Forwarding Control Packets When an MN sends a HIP control packet 1)
through an FA, a THIT and a signature by THI are attached to the HIP header.
The MN designates the destination by the FORWARD TO option including the
IP address of the CN. The FA veri¯es the signature and makes sure that the
sender is registered.
There is a location privacy problem concerned with UPDATE packets. We
discuss it in 4.3.3.
Forwarding Data Packets An FA has to maintain the database (SPIDB)
to forward data packets encrypted in IPsec. Therefore, the FA monitors base
exchanges and UPDATE messages between an MN and a CN, and learns the
SPI values corresponding to a BHIT pair.
The SPI database contains 4-tuple entries as follows:
(SPI; IPsrc; IPdst; Lifetime)
4.2 Rendezvous Support
4.2.1 Rendezvous Request from CN to MN
Since the MN stores in the RVS its FA's locator (IPforward) as the current address,
the Rendezvous process goes well as usual. The RVS will forward the I1 packet
to the FA, and then the FA will forward it to the right MN (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Rendezvous Request from CN to MN
4.2.2 Rendezvous Request from MN to CN
An RVS cannot forward the I1 packets of the blind base exchange since BHITs
cannot be identi¯ed. In addition, it is not preferable that HIP headers include
a raw HIT of a CN, as it indicates that the MN is the one who communicated
with a particular CN in a particular time of day.
Therefore, we adopt a HIP-over-HIP encapsulation. Figure 8 shows how the
I1 packet to the RVS is carried through IPsec tunnel.
When there are already SAs between the MN and the RVS, the tunnel is
reused. Otherwise, the MN will establish new SAs with the RVS, using the
blind base exchange.
We expect the e±ciency does not fall o® so much. Only one packet, I1, is
carried in this way in a HIP session. When the MN frequently uses a particular
RVS, the HIP session between the MN and the RVS will be kept alive.
4.3 Mobility Support
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Figure 8: Rendezvous Request from MN to CN
We de¯ne two types of roaming. Both do not break an end-point session.
The situations are di®erent according to whether or not the MN simultaneously
changes the FA.
We refer to the movement without changing FA as a local jump (Figure 9),
otherwise a global jump (Figure 10). By and large, the former is good for hiding




Figure 9: Local Jump
4.3.1 Local Jump
The local jump is speci¯ed as follows:
1. The MN gets a new IP address.





Figure 10: Global Jump
3. HIP mobility update signaling is exchanged between the MN and the FA.
4. At the FA, the IPreal ¯eld of the MN is updated in the THIDB.
In this session, the CN does not ¯nd any indication of roaming from receiving
packets, though round trip time might get faster or slower due to the roaming.
Meanwhile, the FA and those on the MN-FA path can notice the roaming,
tracing the constant THI or SPI values. Nevertheless, they can notice at most
that \some one has got moved" since they do not have the actual identity of
the MN.
4.3.2 Global Jump
The global jump is speci¯ed as follows:
1. The MN gets a new IP address.
2. The MN registers to another FA with a new THI.
3. The MN sends an UPDATE message to the RVS and the CN, maybe after
the blind base exchange with them through the new FA.
On the last step, it is recommended to have a rekeying of the Security Associ-
ations. Also, the MAC Address of the MN should be changed on the ¯rst step.
Similarly, all the identi¯ers of the MN should be changed simultaneously, ex-
cept the HIs used for the communications with CN. The HIs used in the BLIND
framework are concealed from all other nodes. Therefore, the roaming is not
detected by the nodes other than the CN.
As for the CN, it will notice the change in FAs. From the viewpoint of the
CN, it looks as if the MN had been located at the point of the old FA and had
moved to the point of the new FA. The MN can change its FA without roaming
as well, whenever it likes.
The cost of registering to a new FA is relatively large, thus packet loss easily
happens. It expects retransmission mechanism in upper layers. When the MN
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does not have any ongoing session, this mode is recommended.
4.3.3 To Avoid the Location Privacy Risk on UPDATE
Problem As speci¯ed in the RFC5202[20], UPDATE packets contain ESP INFO
parameter to tell SPI values used in the session. It indicates an old SPI value
which was used in the previous session. In addition, UPDATE packets are sup-
posed not to be encrypted so that smart middleboxes, e.g. SPINAT[19], on the
path can monitor the SPI values to maintain a forwarding table. Since our FAs
perform a SPI-based packet forwarding, this is also true in our framework.
For this reason, the roaming might be traced by combining the SPI value in
the ESP INFO parameter and the one which had been used before roaming.
An ESP INFO parameter in a HIP header contains an old SPI value and
a new SPI value ¯elds. Combination of the old/new values determines the
behavior of rekeying following Table 5.
Table 5: Relation between ESP INFO and Rekeying Behavior
old SPI value new SPI value
no rekeying an existing value the same value
rekeying an existing value a di®erent non-zero value
new SA zero a non-zero value
deprecating the SA an existing value zero
Solution We use two UPDATE messages to perform one update. The ¯rst
UPDATE message adds a new SA to the session. When this packet is forwarded
at the FA, a 4-tuple entry is properly created in the SPIDB. At this point, the
HIP session is multihomed. An old address with an old SPI remains.
The second UPDATE message depreciates the old SA. This packet includes
the old SPI value, and it might reveal the previous location unless it is en-
crypted. Therefore, we send it as an encrypted HIP data packet. Encryption
does not cause a NAT traversal problem since the old SPI value is already ob-
solete, thus middleboxes do not have to take care of this UPDATE packet. The
old SPI value will be expired in the old FA after a while.
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4.4 Authorized Temporary Host Identity (ATHI)
As described in 3.2.3, unconditional forwarding service for any Temporary Host
Identity might cause serious attacks to the FA. An FA has to accept all anony-
mous nodes for only a temporary identity. A malicious node will register to
an FA with thousands of THIs. The identi¯ers are self-generated public keys.
Thus the FA cannot distinguish malicious nodes from other ordinary users. This
problem can be also applied to the original BLIND Framework.
Therefore, we need a way to authenticate users without knowing their real
identity. The solution we suggest is the authorization using blind signature.
We assume there the FA can authenticate the registered users in some way, for
example, using the user's HI.
4.4.1 Authorization Using Blind Signature
Blind Signature is a kind of digital signature protocols, introduced by Chaum
[21][22]. It is a bit misleading but the word `blind' has no relationship with
the BLIND Framework. It is a protocol for a situation where Alice wants to
make Bob sign to her secret text, however, she does not want Bob to read the
content.
1. The MN generates a THI
2. The MN ask the FA of sign to the THI
3. The FA authenticates the MN based on the real identity
4. The FA signs the THI by Blind Signature
5. When using THI, the MN shows the FA's signature to the FA
The signature issued by the FA should have a time limit. Otherwise, the size
of table will continue to increase.
4.4.2 Other Problems
Restricting users leads to reveal some information about the user. If very few
nodes registered with an FA, a use of the FA has a big deal of information.
Therefore, FAs which is used for location privacy protection should hold enough




² MN ! FA ! CN
² CN ! FA ! RVS ! MN
² CN ! FA ! MN
Table 6: Location Privacy Protection of Our Framework
CN FA RVS onlookers
° ° ° °
Since our protocol is based on the BLIND with untrustworthy Forwarding
Agent, the MN obtains complete location privacy. Also, our protocol provides
mobility.
5.2 Incident Scenario
Now we take a look at the incidents involved in our framework. We clarify the
obligation of each node.
5.2.1 Collusion
The CN and the FA can collude to compromise the MN's location privacy. If
the CN gives the raw HI of the MN and the corresponding BHIT, while the FA
gives the IP address of the MN corresponding to the given BHIT, then they
obtain both HI and IP address of the MN.
5.2.2 Adversary MN
If the MN is a malicious node and took an active attack to the CN, then police
will investigate the CN's and FA's logs, so as to identify, locate, and arrest the
MN.
For this purpose, end-points both should store logs of HIT-BHIT pair, and
FAs should store logs of IP-BHIT pair.
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5.3 Fault Tolerance
In our framework, there are two types of nodes as single points of failure, namely
FA and RVS. When one of these nodes gets hung-up suddenly, the communica-
tion in progress will be stopped.
Multiplexing these nodes is an approach in case of this kind of failure.
5.3.1 Multiplexing Forwarding Agent
Since HIP is equipped with multihoming, we can utilize it for multiplexing FA
and RVS. If the MN is multihomed, the failure will be automatically recovered.
The MN has a little drawback for multihoming in terms of location privacy.
The Security Associations of the MN are possibly related due to the same IP
address, though its identi¯ers are concealed as well.
5.3.2 Multiplexing Rendezvous Server
Similarly, the MN can also register to some RVSs at once. Packets are correctly
forwarded regardless of the RVSs.
Besides, RVS can be operated in a distributed environment such as Dis-
tributed Hash Table (DHT), where the nodes in disorder are automatically
avoided. In such case, the MN does not have to care about a failure in the RVS
to some degree.
5.4 Scalability
Currently, we do not specify any rules in selecting an FA. It should be controlled
based on the privacy policy of each node. However, it might cause access con-
vergence in particular FAs, and this can be an obstacle for scalability.
One way of avoiding congestion is to introduce area. It can be used to
decrease concentration of users, for example, distant people are not permitted
to use the FA. However, it also might cause privacy leakage, and we should
careful for that.
Probably we should introduce a congestion control system, so that clients
can select an FA based on topological distance and tra±c.
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5.5 Service Model
In this section, we discuss a service model of FAs. As we saw in the previous
chapter, FAs are placed to serve identi¯able users.
Suppose that a forwarding service provider manages a lot of FAs all over the
world. A user applies for the forwarding service, and he registers his public key
for authentication. Now, the user generates a set of THIs, then ask the provider
to sign his THIs. After authentication, he will get THIs with signature by the
blind signature protocol. He has a list of the FAs, and choose one. Using one
of the THIs with signature, he can register to the FA and take advantage of it.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed IP mobility protocols and the location privacy prob-
lem. We proposed a new framework using HIP, and we showed that it is possible
to protect location privacy from all other nodes in IP communication with mo-
bility. We de¯ned an extensional mobility management protocol of BLIND,
based on a mechanism to separate IDs for mobility from those for end-to-end
communication. Also we constructed a service registration with anonymous au-
thentication using blind signature. We evaluated our framework by comparing
with existing researches and considering, fault tolerance, scalability and service
model.
A congestion controlling discussed in 5.4 is a future work. Some experiments
and evidence that it will work in practice are also desired to be done.
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